Influence of 2007 post election violence on growth of small-scale businesses in sotik town, Kenya.

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ABSTRACT:- This study investigated the influence of 2007 post-election violence on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya. Small-scale businesses play a vital role in the production and distribution of goods and services in the developing world. The 2007 PEV seriously affected the growth of SSBs in Sotik town, Kenya. This study was guided by the following objectives: To establish whether the killings of SSBOs due to 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, To determine the extent to which pillaging that was experienced in the 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, To evaluate property destruction due to 2007 PEV and their influence on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town. To determine whether moving of small-scale businesses to other regions as a result of 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town and to establish measures to boost growth of small-scale businesses that suffered due to 2007 PEV in Sotik town in the opinion of the respondents. Descriptive survey design was used using a questionnaire and an observation guide. The study established that killings of small-scale business owners due to 2007 PEV influenced negatively growth of SSBs in Sotik town. It determined the extent to which pillaging due to 2007 PEV influenced growth of SSBs in Sotik town. It evaluated property destruction due to 2007 PEV and their influence on growth of SSBs in Sotik town. Determination of whether moving of small-scale businesses to other areas due to the 2007 post-election violence influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town was done. It further sought possible measures of boosting growth of SSBs that suffer due to Post-election violence. The study reviewed related literature on influence of PEV on growth of small-scale businesses and the theoretical framework was based on Dahrendorf’s violence theory. The target population was all the 140 small-scale businesses that were duly registered in Sotik town, Kenya. The accessible population was 140 duly registered SSBs in Sotik town. Sample size used was 103 of the 140 SSBs. Simple random sampling procedure was used. The research instruments used were pretested on three respondents who were not included in the actual study. In collecting data a research permit was sought. The study employed the use of frequency tables and percentages. Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics. The study concluded that the 2007 PEV had a negative influence on the growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town. The study recommends that the government should find a viable way of assisting SSBOs whose SSBs were affected by the 2007 PEV among other recommendations. The study also recommended further research on how government can address issues to do with PEV.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Post-election violence (PEV) is not a new phenomenon in the world.Violence has always had influence on growth of small-scale businesses due to its devastating effects. Violence is mainly caused by land disputes, ethnicity, economic and political inequality and poor governance (GoK, 2006).

Take the case of Burma in the recent times: refugees are fleeing their country in thousands in post-election violence between government troops and ethnic Karen tribesmen. The refugees are streaming across the border into Thailand in the wake of Burma’s first election in two decades. These people are relocating to Thailand (Fish, 2010).

In Ivory Coast, it was meant to be a blessing but Laurent Gbagbo turned it into a curse. After eight years of disunity occasioned by the 2002-2003 civil wars, the people of Ivory Coast had eagerly looked forward to the October 31, 2010 presidential ballot in the hope that it would finally re-unite their country. But that was not to be, as the wily Gbagbo refused to play the Sportsman, preferring, instead, to dare the Ivorian people and the International community by refusing to hand over power to the winner, veteran opposition leader Alassane...

Ouattara. Using the constitutional council led by one of his staunch allies, Paul Yao N’Dre, Gbagbo upturned the result, claiming that election was rigged in Ouattara’s northern stronghold. Gbagbo was hurriedly sworn in after N’Dre announced that he had won a little more than 50% of the votes, an action which was promptly rejected by Ouattara, who declared himself president and was sworn in at the Golf Hotel in the commercial capital Abidjan. Emboldened by the continued backing of his illegality by the Ivorian armed forces, Gbagbo even had the effrontery to demand the exit of 10,000 UN peacekeepers in the country – a demand promptly rejected by the world body. About 200 people have been killed in this crisis (Special correspondent, 2011). The announcement of the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya on December 27th 2007 led to what could be described as the worst political violence in Kenya’s history. No sooner were the results announced than violence broke out. Chaos erupted especially in opposition strongholds with fighting targeting communities perceived to have supported the president. In the Rift Valley, in places like Sotik, Chepilat, Eldoret, Molo, Narok and Nakuru, the violence became an all-out ethnic cleansing exercise, where some ethnic groups (specifically the Kikuyu and the Kisii) were targeted for removal ostensibly to be sent back to their “ancestral lands.” The most graphic of this was the incident in a church in Eldoret, where a number of people including women, children and people with disabilities had sought sanctuary only to meet brutal fate as all were burnt to death. What makes the incident tragic and horrific is that even those who escaped from inferno were promptly thrown back into the fire where they perished (Nyangoma, 2008).

There was fighting in other areas as well. In Nairobi for example, there were chaos and mayhem in poor neighborhoods like Kibera and Mathare. Kibera reputed to be the largest slum in Africa, bore the brunt of the chaos, complete with ethnic overtones. In these areas, these violence took a graphic in human form with neighbour hacking neighbour using crude weapons like pangas, and burning what little was left of their simple dwellings that they called home. Kiosks went up in smokes and the rail lines were uprooted. Police responded, killing people in the process. In the age of video-cam coders and instant replay, some policemen were caught on camera shooting unarmed demonstrators (Momanyi, 2010).

As chaos continued illicit militias came into play. Soon revenge attacks were reported in Naivasha and Nakuru, this time targeting the Cleansers, the Kalenjins and the Luos. In central province churches and government compounds provided shelter for the Luos and the Kalenjins fearing revenge attacks. As the world watched, thoughts of Rwanda came into mind. World leaders and Kenyan watchers feared for regional turmoil that would follow the breakup of the country (Nyangoma, 2008).

Thanks to the efforts of Kofi Annan and other African eminent persons for mediating between the warring parties i.e. Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange Democratic Party (ODM) which culminated in a power sharing agreement which bore a coalition government and the support and pressure from all over the world on the Kenyan leaders to form a coalition government (Oluwafemi, 2008).

The death toll from 2007-2008 PEV stood at over 1,300 and 650,000 displaced persons. In Sotik constituency, shops were looted, infrastructure destroyed, livestock stolen, homes torched, many entrepreneurs and small-scale business owners killed and many relocated to other areas. Private schools and private medical clinics were razed. No government intervention was seen (Momanyi, 2010).

1.2 Statement of the problem

Small-scale businesses play a vital role in the production and distribution of goods and services in the developing world (McCormick & Pedersen, 1996). A survey on the economic activities and growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, after the 2007 post-election violence by the researcher, showed that growth of SSBS had declined compared to the situation that was there before the post-election violence period. This was also confirmed by both the Town Clerk of Town Council of Sotik Mr. Cheibon and the town treasurer, Mr. Lebai. (Personal communication)

The 2007 PEV seriously affected the growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya. Sotik town is cosmopolitan. It is in the South Rift. Many small-scale business owners were killed and many more wounded. Shops and private houses of the so called “foreigners” were burnt and pillaged, property was destroyed, animals stolen and matatu businesses halted. Small-scale business people (owners) moved their businesses elsewhere because of fear affecting the growth of businesses in Sotik constituency significantly. Some of those who ran away fearing for their lives when they came back they found they had been displaced So far the Kenyan government has done nothing to salvage these small-scale businesses which are the pillars of development. Hence, the need for this study.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of the 2007 PEV on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya.

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1.4 Objectives
This study was guided by the following objectives:
1. To establish whether the killings of small-scale business owners due to 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya.
2. To determine the extent to which pillaging that was experienced in the 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya.
4. To determine whether moving of small-scale businesses to other regions as a result of 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya.
5. To establish measures to boost growth of small-scale businesses that suffered due to 2007 PEV in Sotik town in the opinion of respondents.

1.5 Research questions
1. How did the killings of owners of small-scale businesses due to 2007 PEV influence growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya?
2. To what extent did the pillaging of the 2007 PEV influence growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya?
3. How did property destruction due to 2007 PEV influence growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya?
4. In what ways did the moving of small-scale businesses to other regions due to 2007 PEV influence growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya?
5. What measures can be used to boost growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town after the 2007 PEV in the opinion of the respondents?

1.6 Significance of the study
There is no previous study to contribute to the knowledge of influence of 2007 PEV on growth of small-scale businesses. The findings of this study will form a useful reference material to the government. The government can use it to generate plans of action that can influence growth of small-scale businesses after violence. The study will show that PEV are bad to the economic development of the country because they have a negative influence on small-scale businesses. This study will enrich the current body of knowledge.

1.7 Limitations of the study
This study faced the following limitations:
At earlier stages the respondents were very reluctant to participate in the study but after creating some good rapport with them they accepted to participate but again they feared that they were being prepared for The Hague. Those who lost their loved ones, because of trauma decided not to respond.

1.8 Delimitations of the study
The study considered small-scale businesses duly registered in Sotik town, Kenya. Since Sotik town was far from those other areas that were affected by the 2007 PEV with unique geographical features, the findings of this study could not be generalized to apply across the board.

1.9 Assumptions of the study
The basic assumptions of the study were that all the respondents will cooperate and that they will read the questionnaire, understand it and respond appropriately. This they did.

1.10 Definition of significant terms as used in the study
Growth- The process of becoming larger by considering revenue and number of employees
Influence- the power to affect the way someone or something develops.
Post-election violence – fights after an election
Small-scale businesses – in this context it means an enterprise that is run by family members and has less than three employees.
Small-scale business deterioration- Lose stock of goods

1.11 Organization of the study
Chapter one consists of background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, limitations of the study, delimitations of the study, definition of significant terms and organization of the study.

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Chapter two is the literature review with the introduction, past studies on killings, past studies on pillaging, past studies on property destruction past studies on moving of small-scale businesses to other regions and the plans of action that can influence growth of small-scale businesses after PEV, the theoretical framework, conceptual frame-work and the literature gaps.

Chapter three is research methodology which has an introduction, research design, target population, sample size, sampling procedures, research instruments, piloting of instruments, validity and reliability of instruments and data collection procedures, data analysis techniques, ethical considerations and operational definition of variables.

Chapter four has the data presentation, analysis and interpretation and chapter five has the summary of findings, discussion, conclusion and recommendations.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the concept of post-election violence, review of related literature on killings, previous studies on pillaging, review of previous works on property destruction, earlier studies on moving of small-scale businesses to other areas after post-election violence and past studies on measures to boost growth of small-scale businesses after post-election violence. The chapter will also look at the theoretical frame-work, conceptual frame-work, the literature gaps and the chapter summary.

2.2 The concept of post-election violence

Visible violent events of post-election Kenya in 2007 are a premise to understanding the concepts of violence, which were manifested in various forms. The scenario exposed the vulnerability of women, children and youth but most significantly expressed the desperation of young people living broken lives and ambitions in a country that finds them invisible. Contextualizing violence and its visibility has a tendency to blind people from defining, observing and responding to the invisible attributes of violence thus perpetuating a cycle that only stresses open and explosive tensions (Marianne, 1998).

Post-election violence in Rift Valley Province where Sotik town is found has five distinct faces; 1) Economic marginalization and superiority perceptions amongst and across communities; 2) Political machinations and consequences; 3) Criminal activities including cattle rustling and organized gangs; and 4) Ethical gaps within public institutions and 5) the role of governments in the national violence.

2.3 Review of related literature on killings

Scholarly work on the subject of election violence has grown significantly in recent years. There is no accepted definition of “election-related killings.” Many definitions of election violence rely strongly on intent or motive element. In one of the most influential and important global studies of electoral violence, Fischer defines electoral violence as “any random or organized act to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process (Fischer, 2002).

In Schwartz’s work on the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, he found that the causes of violence included a lack of faith in the electoral commission or its independence; lack of awareness of the electoral process; political repression; forced disenfranchisement of opponents; poverty; lack of funding for the electoral process and incitement (Schwartz, 2002).

In order to understand and analyze the phenomenon of election related killings, the Special Rapporteur carried out detailed research on selected countries that experienced election violence. During the last five years since 2007. In 2008, reports of killings were documented in nearly 20% of the countries that held elections that year. In his research he has covered in detail election killings in Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe among others.

The Special Rapporteur visited Kenya in February 2009 and investigated the widespread violence that followed the general elections held in December 2007. Violence erupted amidst allegations of electoral fraud, and anger at the announced election results. The Waki Commission, a national commission of inquiry chaired by Justice Waki, produced a comprehensive report detailing the circumstances and causes of 1,113 killings that occurred in that period. The report identifies both spontaneous and organized violence resulting in high numbers of election related killings (UN Special Rapporteur, 2009).

A study done by Collier and Hoeflfler on killings after violence indicates that the most obvious consequence of violence is that it kills people. Violence kill people in many ways: civilians and soldiers are killed in combat,
people die because there is higher prevalence of preventable and communicable diseases and during violence people are killed due to violent crimes (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).

Teshome in his studies about Ethiopia’s 2005 elections shows that 193 people were killed and more than 40,000 detained. He reckons that though the pre-election and the voting day were remarkably peaceful, the post-election period was marred by electoral violence. He says the 2005 elections were the worst in the country’s political history (Teshome, 2009).

In early 2008, Post-election violence swept across Kenya. Within communities, households rose up against household, businesses were pillaged, livelihoods destroyed and unity divided (Mott, 2008).

Thousands of people lost their lives in the post-election bloodshed out of which most of them were innocent lives. Besides large scale killings, there were also thousands of people wounded and property worth millions destroyed. During the post-election violence, 1,133 Kenyans lost their lives and about 600,000 were displaced. At the moment, thousands of those that were displaced are still languishing in camps across the country (Ouma, 2011).

Small-scale business entrepreneurs for example those who owned land were killed, their Title Deeds either got lost or burnt during 2007 post election violence. Their kinsmen or family members ran away. After the violence they have gone back to their business locations only to find them redistributed to people from certain ethnic groups hence have no claim or place to go (Gertrude, 2008).

During the 2007 post election violence, gangs rampaged through Naivasha town, killing and castrating members of one community they accused of supporting the ODM presidential contender Raila Odinga. They went from door to door, flushing out men, women and children. One gang torched a residential building where at least 14 people were burnt to ashes. People who were traveling from Nairobi to up country were vetted. Public and private vehicles were stopped and occupants asked to identify themselves. A man was forced out of a matatu, slashed, stoned and left to die. Bernard Ndege a fisherman living in Naivasha had his house on fire with his two wives and nine children missing. He saved none of them (Mathangani and Gitonga, 2011).

Kiambaa, in the Rift Valley drew world attention when 28 people including children and a disabled woman on a wheelchair who had sought refuge in a church, were burnt to death. Four people were charged in a Nakuru court but were later released for lack of evidence (Too, 2011).

2.4 Previous studies on pillaging
Pillaging involves the removal of valuable or cultural precious objects during a period of violence and turmoil. It differs from scavenging where people may take items like food, water and medicine for survival sometimes without the intent of paying or making good of those items in the future. In pillaging also known as looting, the objects stolen are usually not necessary for survival and can have very high resale value or cultural importance: things like objects of art, cultural artifacts and human remains may be looted. This activity appears to be almost as old as human civilization, according to numerous records documenting the plundering of ancient cities like Carthage and Alexandria, sometimes on multiple occasions. Historically conquering people have looted heavily from the civilizations, they take over precarious items to their home nations and the destroying objects they cannot carry or move safely. Looting during periods of violence has persisted through modern era with troops taking valuable objects from the communities they pass through. In addition of being linked with violence, looting can also occur during natural disasters, riots, periods of political turmoil and other events (www.wisegeek.com).

Looting originally referred primarily to the plundering of villages and cities not only by victorious troops during warfare but also by civilian members of the community. Civilian members of the community take advantage of the violence situation and loot all they can access from their defeated enemies (en.wikipedia.org).

It is true that rampant pillaging of stores, shops and pulling down of kiosks and taking all that is in those kiosks due to PEV is also accompanied by severe burning of the premises leaving the owners of these premises without shops and therefore rendering them helpless. (wonderyou.word press.com).

The effects of looting and arson were mostly felt by the small entrepreneurs whose limited capital and investment were destroyed (Kenya Association of manufacturers, 2008).
The word ‘pillaging’ has a military root. It implies that invading armies take property by force when the rightful owners cannot protect them. During violence the owners are forced out giving way to the invading armies to take control. (Russel & Quarantelli, 1967).

A study done by Sengupta indicates that more than two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, 10,000 artefacts pillaged from the National Museum are still missing. Archaeological sites across the country have been plundered. There has been a struggle to protect this priceless heritage. The National Museum of Iraq is now a sorry sight. The rusting gates are shut to the public, inside layers of dust lie across the 28 galleries empty of everything except a dozen ancient statues which are just too vast to move. More than two and half years after the ransacking of the museum following the liberation of Baghdad by US troops, almost 10,000 items including some of the most precious treasures of antiquity in the world are missing (Sengupta, 2005).

Bogdanos in his article ‘Thieves of Baghdad” says that those antiquities of Iraq have only been returned due to USA’s interventions (Bogdanos, 2005).

Another study done by Goltz shows that pillage has been a feature of nearly every violence fought since ancient times. But rarely has it been carried out with such ruthless efficiency as in the war between Abkhaz separatists and the new government of Georgia in 1992 and 1993. One reason the violence exploded into open war was the stunning amount of pillaging carried out by the Mkhedriono, a quasi-state militia led by warlord Jaba Touselianl, and the National Guard commanded by Tengiz Kitovani. The ‘White Knights and National Guard requisitioned entire airplanes to haul their heisted televisions, radios, refrigerators, carpets and chairs out of the Abkhaz Capital of Sukhumi. The Abkhaz paid the Georgians back in spades when they managed to drive not only the Georgia defense forces from the territory in late September 1993, but also the vast majority of the Georgian population living in the area. Anything left behind became fair game for seizure – cars, appliances, the contents of kitchen pantries, everything. Although the practice of pillage in violence has been prohibited for nearly a century; few countries and cultures are exempt from the charge. The 1907 Hague Convention states: “The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.” Prior to the Hague Convention, pillage was widely accepted to compensate for the risks and losses from that method of conquest (Goltz, 2010).

2.5 Review of previous works on property destruction

The post-election violence and the resultant destruction of life and property has had unexpected impact on small-scale businesses and the economy in general. Small-scale businesses in Kenya lost property – burnt buildings, machinery, farms, and vehicles as well as inventory. Majority of firms were also severely indirectly affected in that their distribution channels and their raw materials were disrupted as a result of backlogs in the port, destruction meted on sources especially agricultural sector and impassable roads owing to security concerns (Kenya Association of Manufacturers, 2008).

Destruction of property also includes destruction of infrastructure.

Critical infrastructure sectors include Agriculture, Law firms, Banking, Health facilities like hospitals and dispensaries, finance, commercial facilities, communications, energy, schools, shops, roads, dams and food. Attacks on critical infrastructure could significantly disrupt the functioning of small-scale businesses and can produce cascading effects on the physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural man made or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human carnalities, property destruction and economic effects as well as profound damages to public morals and confidence. Protecting and ensuring the continuity of the critical infrastructure are essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality and way of life. Critical infrastructures are the assets, systems and networks whether physical or virtual so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a disability effect on security, national economic security, public health safety.

2.6 Earlier studies on moving of small-scale businesses to other regions

Articles written by Practical Hydraulics indicate that any proper moving of one small-scale business from one region to another involves the transfer of the business operations to what is termed a ‘comparable’ location. In this way the business retains access to a customer base that is similar to what is left behind and which will allow the business not only to function at similar levels but also experience further growth and development. Before you move your small-scale business you need to study the current market conditions, the reputation of the small-scale business as well as the current operating conditions and the level of income. In fact, small-scale business relocation target both physical and non-physical characteristics so that a comprehensive view can be established even before the first piece of equipment is moved from site A to site B. Both advantages and disadvantages are looked at (Hydraulics, 2011).
Residents of Côte d’Ivoire began a run on the country’s banks today amid fears that more would close as a result of the past election violence. Dozens of people anxiously lined up outside bank branches from early in the morning in the plateau business district of Abidjan after four foreign banks said they were suspending activities. “I’d rather have my money in reach, nobody knows what will happen,” a soldier in queue in front of the Moroccan owned societe ivoirienne de banque told an AFP reporter. Four foreign banks have closed their offices amid a cash crisis caused by sanctions taken by the West African central bank, the BCEAO. Against the government of strongman Laurent Gbagbo. The local subsidiary of French giant societe generale, the SGBCI, one of the largest operators in the country’s banking sector, shut down joining British bank standard charted (AFP)

This report is relevant to the current study but doesn’t tell us what will happen to those small-scale businesses that relied heavily on these bank that have closed.(daily nation Feb. 18, 2011 Pg 20)

Any business person considering relocation should think about overhead, says Francis R Caroll, who runs the small-scale business service bureau Iric, a private small organization and consulting firm in Worcester, mass moving a business is like staging a wedding or a war. The success is the planning. You have to have the backups, says Robert Andoh, area director of University of Georgia’s Business outreach services. Plan ahead of time, have contingency plans for every step of the way (finance.msn.com.au)

Today there is almost always a reason for relocating a business from one place to another. In general there are five factors that could influence relocation of small-scale business. The major one, being accrual moving. This is a situation where you are forced to move your business due to damages done to your business premises (www.market4everything.info).

2.7 Past studies on measures to boost growth of small-scale businesses after PEV

The re-occurrence of violence and their impact on human small-scale businesses in Kenya has led to realization of the need to prioritize the management of violence and to promote a culture of peace. More recently, the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Violence Management as not only developed a draft framework but also formulated a draft national policy on peace building and violence management. There is need to look beyond the immediate triggers of violence by formulating policies and economic blue prints that seek to improve household incomes, access to education, social services and international relationships (GoK, 2006).

The following action plans can be used to address Post Election Violence in Kenya and subsequently influence growth of small-scale businesses which are the pillars of development.

2.7.1 Enacting and enforcement of relevant laws.

Law reform relating to violence issues such as land, firearms, recognition of peace processes, access and use of national resources should be expedited. The role of traditional natural resource management should be supported and legalized (Green, 1993).

2.7.2 Addressing the violence.

There is need to increase state presence along the borders and promote peace building initiatives amongst warring communities. Development projects targeting the youths would be a disincentive to participation in raids or wars (Green, 1993).

2.7.3 Engendering peace building.

Women and men had different access to power structures and material resources before, during and after violence. They experienced violence in different ways at various stages of the violence process. The variety of the roles that women have taken up due to violence has not been adequately documented leading to a misconception of women as victims of violence. However, women act as peace breakers, peace makers and carers of survivors at the various stages of violence situations. There is need for the roles of women and men to be identified and recognized in the design of strategic interventions addressing violence (GoK, 1999).

The government and other actors need to recognize that women come from different backgrounds such as communities, religions, class and these differences should be accommodated in the design of strategic interventions. Grass-root women peace initiatives should be linked with national peace processes. Men should also be empowered as parents, carers and community members in order to aid in transforming harmful traditional conceptualizations of femininity and masculinity. They should be supported as peace activists so as to avoid the risk of peace work being perceived as men’s work (Mbugua and Kaara, 2003).
2.7.4 Improvement of infrastructure.
   The government should rehabilitate and revive social institutions like schools and hospitals which have been put to waste by intercommunity violence. Of primary importance would be building more schools especially in border areas, employing teachers, assuring them security and motivating them to work in the region. Peace education should be integrated into the national curriculum in an effort to build a culture of peace in the nation and therefore creating national cohesion (GoK, 1999).

2.7.5 Promotion of African Customary Governance Systems.
   The government should take initiative to bring elders from all conflicting communities together and encourage them to dialogue as a means to solving their problems instead of resorting to armed response. When peace talks will replace wars then small arms will lack market. A particular and relevant policy shift will be the recognition of the existence and role of traditional African systems of governance and violence resolution. Elders’ courts and councils should be entrenched in the constitution and relevant policy frameworks in Kenya. The government should encourage the establishment peace committees in every location where violence are prevalent (Pkalya and Masinde, 2004).

2.7.6 Expeditious completion of national policy formulation process
   The process of drafting a national policy on peace building and violence management began in earnest in June 2005 and was expected to be completed within a period of four months. Almost one year later, the process remains incomplete and has been plagued by delays and logistical obstacles. The draft policy has been submitted and it is expected to be presented to the stakeholders in regional forums around the country culminating with a national forum where the final draft will be validated. Thereafter it is expected that the policy will be approved by the cabinet and presented to parliament as a sessional paper. If parliament accepts the sessional paper, a bill will be drafted to be tabled in parliament for enactment. This process needs to be expedited if violence and their impacts in Kenya are to be managed (Mohamud and Pkalya, 2005).

2.7.7 Reforming and strengthening Police Force.
   There is a critical need to reform the entire Police Force so that systems and structures that take into account human right issues are engrained within the police force. The public should see the police as a partner in security issues including law and order but not as coercive instrument of the state as the situation is currently. The endemic violence in Kenya have proved that the governments’ efforts through the police have failed to resolve violence in the country. The police force should be equipped with necessary equipment and personnel to enable it respond effectively and in a timely manner to violence in Kenya. Priority should be given to violence prone areas in terms of allocating resources to police divisions and stations (GoK, 2005).

2.7.8 Institutionalizing and strengthening peace committees.
   District peace committees have been established in a number of districts in violence prone regions particularly in the Arid and semi-arid Lands (ASALs). The government has recognized the important role that they play in early warning and violence prevention. Their operations are however, hampered by the lack of adequate resources to fund their activities and logistical support from government agencies. There is need to strengthen these committees because they are participatory in community based mechanisms that can form part of a holistic and effective national structure of violence management. Their role and function needs to be institutionalized within the administrative structure and their existence recognized under law to provide them with legitimacy and authority they require to perform violence management activities (GoK, 2003).

2.7.9 Creating a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in a transparent way and respecting it.
   Post violence interventions, target communities emerging from violence and should include all measures aimed at rebuilding destroyed relationships, livelihoods and infrastructure as well as healing processes to address violence related trauma and psycho-social destabilization. Specifically these issues will include: Reconciliation, rehabilitation, restorative justice and reconstruction of infrastructure. Activities related to displacements (refugees, IDPs, BPs etc), reintegration and disarmament (GoK, 2006).

2.7.10 Compensation by government of those who lose during inter-community violence
   In order for the economy to get back to pre-election vibrancy , a revolving fund should be established by government to provide strategic emergency relief and humanitarian assistance for victims of violence. Those who lose their small-scale businesses should be assisted by government to revive them (GoK, 2006).

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2.8 Theoretical Framework
This study is modeled on Dahrendorf’s violence theory. Ralf Dahrendorf rejects the Marxian notion of social class as determined by the relations to the means of production and defines it in terms of the unequal distribution of authority. All groups in society are seen as divided into those who have authority and those who do not. He maintains that social violence has a structural origin and has to be understood as a violence about legitimacy of relations of authority (Dahrendorf, 1959).

In any organization, roles and positions can be dichotomized into two “quasi groups” whose members have opposed “latent interests.” The group in position of power is interested in preserving the status quo, whereas the subordinated group is interested in change. These two “quasi groups” are potential antagonists, in that their members share common experience, roles and interests whether or not they are aware of them. Under proper conditions of organizations interest groups emerge out of quasi groups as the members develop a leadership cadre, effective intragroup communication, a consistent ideology, and an awareness of their common interests. Dahrendorf suggests that the more subordinate interests groups become organized, the more likely they will be in violence with the dominant group. The conditions of violence such as opportunities for social mobility and the responses of the agents of social control, will determine the intensity and violence of violence. He proposes that the more organized the interest groups and the more regulated their violence, the less violent the violence will be. Violence in turn leads to structural change as a result of a change in dominance relations. Dahrendorf concludes that the great creative force that leads to change in society is social violence. To him societies and social organizations are held together not by consensus but by constraint, not by universal agreement but by coercions of some by others. He assumes that violence is ubiquitous, since constraint is ubiquitous wherever human beings set up social organizations (Dahrendorf, 1967).

Dahrendorf’s theory applied in the Kenyan situation immediately after 2007 elections and the violence that ensued. It is true that violence leads to structural changes, but which are these structural changes to small-scale businesses?

2.9 Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework is based on the interaction between the independent variables i.e. influence of 2007 post-election violence and the dependent variable – the small-scale businesses growth. The independent variables included the 2007 Post-election killings, the 2007 Post-election pillaging, the 2007 Post-election property destruction, the 2007 Post-election small-scale business relocation and measures of boosting growth of small-scale businesses.

**Conceptual framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killings Of business owners</td>
<td>Growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, e.g. in terms of Revenue, Number of employees, capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillaging, e.g. of goods, cows, chicken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property destroyed e.g. buildings, livestock, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving Businesses to Other areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boosting growth of businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corresponding Author: Enock Angima Onyancha*
2.10 Literature Gaps

Small-scale businesses are the predominant form of business in rural economies, where they account for 90 percent of all rural establishments (Buss & Yancer, 1999). This means that they play a vital role.

Nearly two thirds of all rural jobs are found in small-scale businesses making them a vital part of the rural economy. The types of industries served by small rural businesses are primarily in the non-producer industries, including accommodation, social services retail, and recreation which are generally lower paying industries (McDaniel, 2001).

Studies show that less than 40% of the small-scale businesses exist for five years or more (Muske, Jin & Yu, 2004). Existing literature about the relationship between post-election violence and growth of small-scale businesses appears to be very scarce. The factors behind the growth of small-scale businesses are still unexplored (Deakins & Freel, 1998).

Past studies on killings which include killings due to PEV, do not indicate what happens to small-scale businesses when their owners have been killed. Does the business continue to exist and if it does, is there any growth realized?

Some of the common ways of measuring a small-scale business’s growth include revenue, profits and human and physical capital (Burkham et al, 1996).

UN’s Special Rapporteur’s study does not show us what influence on the growth of small-scale businesses the 2007-8 PEV had.

In Teshome’s study about Ethiopia’s 2005 elections, 193 people were killed due to PEV. The study does not tell us however, how the killing of these people influenced small-scale business growth in Ethiopia, either negatively or positively. This is what this study will establish. Ouma in his article indicates that many people lost their lives during the 2007 PEV in Kenya. Many more were displaced and others were forced to move their small-scale businesses elsewhere. What is lacking in this article is whether these small-scale businesses improved in growth, died or declined.

Our literature has reviewed past studies on pillaging called looting also. This review perfectly indicates that during violence precious objects are taken by the invaders and the activity appears to be as old as human civilization. From the studies it is true that rampant pillaging of stores, shops, and kiosks was realized during the 2007 PEV in Kenya. These studies do not tell us what happens with the shops, stores, kiosks, medical clinics that were pillaged. Do they continue to exist and if they do at improved level or at a deteriorating level?

Sengupta’s study indicates that in a situation where property has been pillaged during a violence, there should be government intervention to ensure that the loot is returned (Sengupta’s, 2005). Was this done in Kenya? The study will try to establish.

Goltz’s study does not give us the way forward for small-scale businesses that are pillaged during violence. Property destruction studies have also been reviewed. Buildings, shops, machinery, vehicles, inventory and kiosks are destroyed. Infrastructure is also destroyed. Is this an impetus to small-scale business growth or not? The previous studies do not show this.

Past studies on relocation of small-scale businesses have clearly indicated that there are good reasons for moving a business from one place to another but do not tell us what happens with a small one which is forced to relocate because of violence. Secondly, if relocated forcibly, does it grow or it declines?

Measures to boost growth of small-scale businesses after post-election violence have not been explored.

2.11 Chapter summary

This chapter attempted to review related works to the topic under study but all these previous studies don’t indicate the influence of post-election violence on the growth of small-scale businesses.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed description of the research methodology. It includes research design, target population, sample size, sampling procedure, data collection instrument, methods of data collection, data analysis techniques, ethical considerations and operational definition of variables.
3.2 Research design
This study was conducted using descriptive survey research design. This is because it was a survey of the existing small-scale businesses in Sotik town to establish peoples’ thoughts, opinions and feelings about the influence of 2007 PEV on the growth of small-scale businesses. Descriptive survey research was used to assess people’s thoughts, opinions and feelings. This design was characterized by use of a set of pre-determined questions for all respondents. By using the same phrasing and ordering of questions, it was possible to summarize the views of all respondents succinctly. When a representative sample of people was asked the same set of questions, the researcher was able to describe the attitudes of the population from which the sample was drawn. (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister, 2003).

Descriptive survey research design presented oriented methodology that was used to provide numeric descriptions of same part of the population. Secondly, describe and explain events as they were, or as they would be (Oso, & Onen, 2009).

3.3 Target population
The target population consisted of all the 140 small-scale businesses that were duly registered by the Town council of Sotik, Kenya.

3.4 Sample size and Sampling procedure
3.4.1 Sample size
The accessible population of this study was the 140 registered small-scale businesses in Sotik town. 103 small-scale businesses were studied out of the 140. This was in line with Krejcie and Morgan who said that a small population required a large sample size and a big population required a small sample size (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970).

3.4.2 Sampling procedure.
The sampling frame for this study was all the 140 registered small-scale businesses in Sotik town. This study employed simple random sampling procedure. In this case the researcher gave a number to all the owners of the small-scale businesses in Sotik town. The number was then placed, in a container and then the researcher picked any number at random until he got the103 out of the 140 (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970).

Simple random sampling had no complexities; all you needed was a relatively small, clearly defined population to use this method. Advantages of simple random sampling were that the samples yielded research data that could be generalized to a larger population. This method also permitted the researcher to apply inferential statistics to the data and provided equal opportunity of selection for each element of the population. It was a procedure in which all the individuals in the defined population had an equal and independent chance of being selected as a member of the sample (Kombo & Tromp, 2006)

3.5 Research Instruments
This study used a questionnaire, and an observation schedule.

Questionnaires
Questionnaires were good because: Confidentiality was upheld, saved time, Information could be collected from a large sample and diverse regions and since they were presented in paper formats there was no opportunity for interviewer bias (Kombo & Tromp, 2006).

A questionnaire was a collection of items to which a respondent was expected to react in writing (Oso & Onen, 2009).

Questionnaires were used since the study was concerned with variables that could not be directly observed such as views, opinions, perceptions and feelings of the respondents (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister, 2003).

Questionnaires were normally used to obtain important information about the population. Each item in the questionnaire was developed to address a specific objective, research question or hypothesis of the study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003)
The researcher self-administered the questionnaire to obtain data from the owners of the small-scale businesses because this was their questionnaire. The questions were open and closed ones. The questionnaire had questions that elicited demographic information that was necessary for the study.

**Observation guides**

Observation was the use of all senses to perceive and understand the experiences of interest to the researcher. It allowed the researcher to see for himself/herself what people actually did rather than what they said they did. This was a good research instrument because it allowed the researcher to gain first-hand experience. It recorded information as it occurred, explored topics that would be uncomfortable to informants and noticed unusual aspects (Oso, & Onen, 2009).

Using the observation schedule the researcher observed the state of those small-scale businesses and noticed some deserted streets; some shops burned and remain of destroyed business premises.

**3.5.1 Piloting of instruments**

The research instruments were pre-tested on three respondents who were not included in the actual study. The purpose of pre-testing the instrument was to ensure that items in the instruments are stated clearly and have the same meaning to all respondents. The respondents on which the instrument was pre-tested were not be part of the selected sample (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

**3.5.2 Validity of instrument**

Validity concerned the crucial relationship between concept and indicator (Cramines, 1979). To determine validity, a pilot study was conducted using three small-scale business owners in Sotik town randomly selected. The same questionnaire was used. The pilot study established the overall appraisal of the questionnaire’s soundness.

Content validity was a measure of the degree to which data collected using a particular instrument represented a specific domain of an indicator or content of a particular concept. In designing an instrument that would yield content-valid data, the researcher was first to specify the domain of indicators which were relevant to the concept being measured (Mugenda, & Mugenda, 2003).

**3.5.3 Reliability of Instruments.**

Reliability was a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yielded consistent results or data after repeated trials. Reliability in research was influenced by random error. As random error increased, reliability decreased. Random error was the deviation from a true measurement due to factors that had not effectively been addressed by the researcher (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

Reliability of instruments was ensured by the researcher deciding what information was sought, what type of questionnaire and observation schedule was used and what order of asking questions was most effective (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister, 2003).

**3.6 Data Collection procedures**

Authority from the ministry was sought to carry out the research in the said area of Sotik town. The Town council of Sotik was also made aware. The research permit gave consent to researcher to participate in the study and letters of approval to conduct research (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

**3.7 Data analysis techniques**

Data analysis referred to examining what had been collected in a survey or experiment and making deductions and inferences. It involved uncovering underlying structures, extracting important variables, detecting any anomalies and testing any underlying assumptions (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). This study employed the use of frequency tables and percentages. This was because it was a quantitative study. Descriptive statistics was also used.

The filled questionnaire was edited to inspect data pieces and identify those items wrongly responded to, spelling mistakes in the response and any blank spaces left unfilled by the respondents.

Data analysis was the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of information collected. Each research question was analyzed using descriptive statistics. Here information was analyzed systematically in order to come out with some useful recommendations and conclusions (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2008)
3.8 Ethical considerations
In carrying out this study the researcher made sure that all the ethical issues were considered. An informed consent procedure was followed. Research participants were ethically obligated to behave appropriately during the research process by not lying, cheating, or engaging in other fraudulent behavior.

The researcher answered all the questions from the participants and any information gotten was kept confidential (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister, 2003). All the citations were acknowledged.

3.9 Operational definition of variables
Operational definition of variables referred to the measurement of a variable. It was the description of the operation that was used in measuring the variable. Operational definition of a variable could be stated quantitatively or categorically (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

Variables in this study were operationalized by use of indicators which were the observable evidence of the degree of presence or absence of the variable one was interested in. The independent variable killings was operationalized by the number of small-scale business owners and consumers killed. Pillaging was operationalized by indicators like goods, cows and chicken pillaged. Property destruction was operationalized by indicators like electricity, fences, buildings, roads, schools and hospitals destroyed. Moving of small-scale businesses to other areas was operationalized by the number of small-scale business owners who relocated to other areas. Measures to boost growth of small-scale businesses were operationalized by government interventions like government subsidies, compensation and securities. Small-scale business growth was operationalized by revenue, number of employees and physical capital.

Table 3.1 OPERATIONALIZATION TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective / research questions</th>
<th>Type of variable</th>
<th>Measure of scale</th>
<th>Data collection method</th>
<th>Data Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How did the killings of owners of small-scale businesses due to 2007 PEV influence growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town?</td>
<td>Independent variable: Killings of owners of small-scale businesses Dependent variable: Growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town.</td>
<td>Number of people killed.</td>
<td>Nominal survey</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what ways did moving of SSBs to other areas due to 2007 PEV influence growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town?</td>
<td>Independent variable: Moving of SSBs to other areas Dependent variable: Growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town.</td>
<td>Movement to other areas Starting new businesses</td>
<td>Nominal survey</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What measures can be used to boost growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town after the 2007 PEV in the opinion of the respondents?</td>
<td>Independent variables: Measures of boosting Dependent variable: Small-scale business growth in Sotik town</td>
<td>Subsidies, Security Compensation resettlement Dialogue, National Healing Constitutional Review</td>
<td>Nominal Survey</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction
This chapter contains analysis, presentation, interpretation and discussion of data collected from the respondents concerning influence of 2007 PEV on growth of SSBs in Sotik town Kenya.

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4.2 Questionnaire Return Rate.
All the questionnaires that were given out were received representing a response rate of 100%. Questionnaires were 103. There was a letter of transmittal accompanying the questionnaire.

4.3 Demographic information of respondents
The respondents were asked to indicate their sex to assist in knowing the majority of people that were doing business in Sotik town. Was it the men or women? The following Table 4.1 shows the responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table above, most of the small-scale businesses in Sotik town are undertaken by men represented by 76.7% against women’s 23.3%. This table was interpreted to mean that women should be empowered to participate more in small-scale businesses. This table was also interpreted to mean that most women who were doing businesses at the time of violence either ran away or closed businesses because of fear, meaning women were affected most.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age bracket</th>
<th>Frequency(f)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-25 years</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30 years</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40 years</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 40 years</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most small-scale business owners were aged between 36-40 represented by 47.6% as the table above shows. The respondents also were asked to indicate their highest level of education. This question was important because with high levels of education the business owners were able to man their businesses well by keeping accounting records well. The responses to this question are represented by Table 4.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College education</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these results the education levels of business-owners cuts across all levels but the majority are with secondary education represented by 64.1% followed by those with college education with 19.41%, those with no education 7.8%, with primary education 5.8% and those with university education 2.9%. This meant that majority of the business owners were literate and therefore able to keep their business records well.

The respondents also indicated their homes of origin and when they started doing business in Sotik town whether it was before 2007 PEV or after. Question one required them to indicate whether they were from Sotik town, other parts of Sotik region and outside Sotik region. If from outside Sotik, to indicate, where. This question was important in establishing the business owners whose businesses were affected whether they were outsiders or not. This was also important because the study could establish whether these violence targeted foreigners or not. The second question could assist to establish those businesses in existence by the time of post-election violence. The following Table 4.4 shows the responses.

*Corresponding Author: Enock Angima Onyancha*
Many small-scale business owners were from Sotik town represented by 47.6% followed by those from other parts of Sotik represented by 27.2%. Those from outside were 25.2%.

4.3: Influence of 2007 PEV on growth of small-scale businesses
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of 2007 PEV on growth of Small-Scale Businesses in Sotik town. The respondents indicated how their small-scale businesses were affected by 2007 PEV. Effects of 2007 Post-election violence on growth of SSBs were divided as follows: Pillaged or looted, Property destroyed, e.g. burnt down, Forced to relocate or closed business temporarily. The following Table 4.5 shows the responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillaged or looted</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property destroyed</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business forced to relocate</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall pillaging had the highest percentage 56.3% followed by property destruction with 36.9%. Relocation of business is the last one with 6.8%. This information was interpreted to mean that the purpose of the study was achieved because the 2007 PEV made businesses to be looted by 56.3%.

Other influences of 2007 PEV that were mentioned by the respondents included: Ethnic tension, Poverty, Environmental degradation, Ethnicity, Ethnic vigilantes, Unemployment, Disempowerment of women, elders and youths, Broken families, prostitution and cross-border violence.

4.3 Influence of killings of small-scale business owners on growth of small-scale businesses
In establishing whether killings of 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya, the respondents were asked whether they were aware of any small-scale business owner(s) doing business in Sotik town who died as a result of 2007 PEV. All of them said they were aware representing 100%. A list of the effects of the killing of SSBOs was given as follows: Closing/Shutting down the business, Family members re-locate the business, Business deteriorated and the business was continued by others e.g. family members. Apart from the list given they were also asked whether there were other effects of the killing of small-scale business owners on the growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town not mentioned above. The following Table 4.6 shows their responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closing down business</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members relocated business</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business continued by others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business deteriorated</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This first objective was achieved by looking at how many businesses closed down, family members relocating business, how many businesses were continued by others and the businesses that deteriorated. Due to the killings of small-scale business owners, businesses deteriorated by 68.9%, Businesses continued by others 12.6%, businesses that closed down 11.7% and businesses relocated by family members 6.8%. Another effect that was not listed but given by the respondents was that the killings of SSBOs made their colleagues whose businesses were not affected to relocate them because they feared for their lives.
4.5 **Influence of 2007 Post-election pillaging on growth of small-scale businesses**

The second objective of this study was to determine the extent to which pillaging that was experienced in the 2007 PEV influenced the growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town.

The respondents were asked to say what type of property was pillaged/looted/stolen, was it stock of goods? Vehicles? Chicken? Cows or household properties? The following Table 4.7 shows their responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Businesses affected</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stock of goods</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household properties</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table most businesses were affected negatively by the 2007 Post-election pillaging. Pillaging affected stock of goods 95.1%, vehicles 1%, cows 2.9% and 1% of household properties. The following Table 4.8 shows the overall effects of pillaging on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closing business</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner relocated</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business deteriorated</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2007 Post-election pillaging made business owners to relocate their businesses by 52.1%, businesses deteriorated by 46% and 1.9% of businesses closed down.

4.6 **Influence of 2007 Post-election property destruction on growth of small-scale businesses**

Objective three of this study was to evaluate the influence of property destruction due to 2007 post-election violence on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town.

The respondents were asked to say the type of property affected including stock of goods, vehicles, livestock, shops and household properties. Effects of property destruction due to 2007 PEV on growth of small-scale businesses were listed as follows: Closing/Shutting down the business, Owner relocated business and business deteriorated. They were also asked to list down any other effects of property destruction due to the 2007 PEV on the growth of SSBs not mentioned above. The following Table 4.9 shows their responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stock of goods</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops destroyed</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household properties of owners</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that stock of goods was affected by 2007 post-election property destruction 72.8%, shops 25.2%, vehicles 1.0% and household properties 1.0%.

The following table 4.10 shows the overall influence of 2007 Post-election property destruction on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Bomet County, Kenya.

Table 4.10: Influence of 2007 Post-election property destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closure of SSBs</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner relocated</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business deteriorated</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2007 Post-election property destruction made 71.8% businesses to deteriorate, 26.2% relocated and 2.0% closed.

4.7 Influence of 2007 Post-election small-scale business relocation on growth of SSBs

The fourth objective of this study was to determine whether the moving of small-scale businesses to other regions as a result of 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town. The respondents were asked whether they were aware of any small-scale business owner who moved away from Sotik town as a result of the 2007 PEV. Effects of 2007 post-election small-scale business relocation on growth of SSBs were listed as follows: Number of businesses reduced, the remaining grew due to reduced competition and business activities in town deteriorated. They were also asked to write down other effects not mentioned. The following Table 4.11 shows the results.

Table 4.11: Influence of 2007 Post-election small-scale business relocation on growth of businesses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of businesses reduced</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The remaining grew due to reduced competition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business activities deteriorated</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2007 Post-election small-scale business relocation made business activities deteriorate by 68% and numbers of businesses reduce by 32%.

4.8 Measures to boost growth of SSBs affected by 2007 PEV

Objective five of this study sought for respondents opinions on how to boost the small-scale businesses that suffered as a result of post-election violence. Some of the measures that the respondents suggested to be adopted to boost the growth of small-scale businesses affected by the 2007 post-election violence were listed as follows: Improving security in town and its environs, giving them soft loans and encouraging reconciliation between warring parties. They were also asked to mention other measures not listed above. Their responses are represented by Table 4.12 as follows:

Table 4.12: Measures to boost the growth of SSBs affected by 2007 PEV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving security</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation by government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft loans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation between warring parties</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82.5% of the respondents said that improving security in the town and its environs was the best measure to boost the growth of small-scale businesses affected by 2007 PEV and 17.5% gave reconciliation between warring parties as the second measure. Nobody said anything about soft loans. This meant that most small-scale business owners were not aware that soft loans were being given by both the government and other financial institutions. It also meant that there is need to inform these business owners about these loans. They need to be empowered economically to boost growth of their businesses.

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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter covers summary of the findings of the study based on the objectives, conclusions drawn from the findings, recommendations of the study and suggestion for further research.

5.2 Summary of findings
The purpose of this study was to investigate influence of 2007 Post-election Violence on growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, Kenya. The study found that the 2007 Post-election pillaging had the greatest negative influence on the growth of small-scale businesses with 56.3% influence, followed by 2007 post-election property destruction represented by 36.9% influence and then businesses forced to relocate had 6.8%.

5.3 Discussion
The objectives of this study were; to establish whether the killings of small-scale business owners due to 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town; to determine the extent to which pillaging that was experienced in the 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, to evaluate whether property destruction due to 2007 PEV influenced growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town, to determine whether moving of small-scale businesses to other areas due to 2007 PEV and to seek respondent’s opinions on how to boost growth of small-scale businesses that suffered due to 2007 PEV.

2007 Post election killings of small-scale business owners had a negative influence on the growth of small-scale businesses in Sotik town. It caused 68.9% of businesses to deteriorate, 12.6% of businesses were continued by others, 11.7% of businesses closed down and 6.8% were relocated.

The 2007 Post-election pillaging influenced the growth of small-scale businesses negatively in Sotik town. The pillaging affected 95.1% of stock of goods, 2.9% cows, 1% of vehicles and 1% of household properties. Overall pillaging made 52.1% owners of small-scale businesses to relocate their businesses, 46% of businesses deteriorated and 1.9% closed down.

The 2007 Post-election property destruction affected 72.8% of stock of goods, 25.2% of shops were destroyed, 1% of vehicles burnt and 1% of household properties destroyed. Overall 71.8% of businesses deteriorated, 26.2% relocated and 2.0% closed down.

The 2007 Post-election moving of small-scale businesses to other areas made 68% of business activities deteriorate and reduced the number of businesses by 32.0%.

The following measures can be used to boost the growth of SSBs affected by 2007 PEV. Improving security represented by 82.5%, reconciliation between warring parties 17.5%, Compensation by government and soft loans among others.

5.4 Conclusion
The 2007 PEV generally had a negative influence on the growth of SSBs in Sotik town, Kenya. From the information gathered the 2007 post-election pillaging had the highest influence followed by property destruction and then small-scale business relocation.

The 2007 PEV made businesses to close down, to relocate and others deteriorated. There is need to address the immediate effects of Post-election killings, lootings and business relocations by government. If this is done then small-scale businesses will grow at an encouraging rate. The following measures can be tried: Government compensating those whose businesses are affected by PEV, National healing should be encouraged, The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission should be strengthened, security should be beefed up and the immediate causes of PEV addressed.

5.5 Recommendations
1) The government should look at those small-scale businesses that were affected by PEV and find a viable way of assisting the owners to reconstruct them so that their growth is boosted.

2) A commission of inquiry should be set up to establish the correct number of small-scale businesses that were affected by the 2007 post-election violence with the sole aim of assisting them to restart business or
boost their growth. This same commission should also establish the root causes of PEV so that government is informed. Remedies to these root causes should also be established.

3) There is the urgent need to develop a tailor made program that recognizes the intricacies within ethnicity to help communities understand the phenomenon of negative ethnicity, not as a source of violence but as a manifestation, having been identified as a pillar to violent political and social structures even in a refined people to people environment.

4) The adaptation of practical community leadership and involvement in widening the curriculum to include Peace education, Environmental awareness, human rights, civil and legal awareness and non-violent violence resolution mechanisms as a means that understand local dynamics, indigenous knowledge and sensitivity to prevailing social realities, strategically improving the way things are done.

5) Putting in place nationally recognized intervention programme with relevant information that builds the capacities of the people to make informed decisions on issues of patriotism, land ownership, national values and social responsibility as a step towards demystifying the misconceptions emphasized by consumerism and materialism in a word economy that feeds on them.

6) Establishing cross-border social networks alive to diverse regional cultural orientations but whose objective enhances shared commonalities, universally acceptable peace seeking mechanisms. Youth movements, mainstream religious institutions and women movements are commendable vehicles in this regard.

7) There is urgent need to put in place mechanisms that not only empower and unite youths economically but also afford them social accommodation within a leadership structure able to address gaps in current systems for posterity.

8) There is need to institute civic education that is designed to detribalize politics in Kenya and stress the effectiveness of collective responsibility on common issues.

5.6 Areas for further research
The following areas are suggested for further research:
1) Causes of Post-election violence in Sotik town;
2) How government can address PEV that occurs after every General Election.
3) Further research is needed to understand that violence dynamics cannot be gainsaid considering that post-election violence exposed the foundation of a Kenyan society previously perceived to be peaceful;
4) Environmental degradation in Sotik town that was caused by the 2007 Post-election violence and
5) Ethnic tension in Sotik town due to Post-election violence.

5.7 Contribution to knowledge
This study has contributed a lot in informing the government that PEV have a negative influence on growth of small-scale businesses. This is because many small-scale business owners lose their lives, many others relocate their businesses, and property is destroyed and looted. This study has also given measures to boost growth of SSBs that suffer post-election violence.

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